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“ON THE PRESENT IS OUR HAPPINESS”: ON AFFECTS IN 
ANCIENT THOUGHT, IN MEMORIUM PIERRE HADOT
Matthew Sharpe
The birds they sing
At the break of  day
‘Start again,’ I heard them say
‘Don’t dwell on what has passed away
And what is yet to be ...’
Leonard Cohen, Anthem 
Hour by hour, life is kindly offered us
We have learned but little from yesterday
Of  tomorrow, all knowledge is forbidden,
And if  I ever feared the coming evening, -
The setting sun still saw what brought me joy.
Do like me, then: with joyful wisdom
Look the instant in the eye! Do not delay!
Hurry! Run to greet it, lively and benevolent,
Be it for action, for joy or for love!
Wherever you may be, be like a child, wholly and always;
Then you will be the All; and invincible.
Goethe, Marienbad Elegy, cited in Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of  Life, p. 231.1
French philosopher Pierre Hadot passed away on the night of  April 24-25, 2011. The following is offered as a 
critical tribute to, and reflection upon his work.
THESES
The theses of  Pierre Hadot’s life work, so important in shaping the later Foucault, are now widely known. They 
are these:
i. Classical philosophy was first of  all an existential choice or way of  life. This way of  life involved 
developing and learning rational, theoretical discourses, which were often highly sophisticated. But it 
was not reducible to the production, learning, or conveying of  theoretical systems. As Hadot liked to 
say, it aimed as much to form the student, as to inform them. The aim was to reshape the student’s 
entire way of  seeing and being in the world: their relations to external things, their own thoughts, and 
others. The “wisdom” ancient philosophy pursued, then, was embodied, and presupposed modes of  
subjective transformation and askesis. In the ancient context, indeed, people who:
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developed an apparently philosophical discourse without trying to live their lives in 
accordance with their discourse, and without their discourse emanating from their life 
experience, were called ‘sophists.’ According to the Stoic Epictetus, [such people] talk 
about the art of  living like human beings, instead of  living like human beings themselves... 
as Seneca put it, they turn true love of  wisdom (philosophia) into love of  words (philologia).2 
ii. The principal means of  this existential transformation were what Hadot called “spiritual 
exercises” (askesis or meletai). These exercises acted primarily on the opinions of  the student, although 
they could extend to bodily practices promoting mastery of  the passions. They involved reasoning 
about one’s experience and attitudes, and exercises in thought (for instance, the famous praemeditatio 
malorum [premeditation of  evils] or memento mori [remembrance of  mortality]) which often strikingly 
anticipated modern psychoanalytic and cognitive behavioural techniques. They engendered and 
involved new, specific institutional forms (like the Platonic academy, the Epicurean garden) and forms 
of  intersubjectivity: Epicurean friendship, the master-pupil relation. They served to constantly orient 
and reorient the student, despite the hardships, distractions and disappointments of  life. Their goal 
was to constantly reactivate in the student the chosen Stoic, Epicurean, Pyrrhonian, etc. attitude 
towards existence, so they did not act contrary to a philosophical view of  the world, self  and others:
In Stoicism, as in Epicureanism, philosophising was a continuous act, permanent and 
identical with life itself, which had to be renewed at each instant. For both schools, this act 
could be defined as an orientation of  the attention.3 
iii. For all the philosophical schools, philosophy was hence therapeutic: in Martha Nussbaum’s phrase, 
a therapy of  desire.4 It found its sufficient motivation in the prevalent human experience of  “suffering, 
disorder, and unconsciousness.”5 As Callicles already complained of  Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias, the 
philosophical way of  life involved a near-complete turning upside-down of  the motivations, and 
evaluative attitudes, of  ordinary men and women. In particular, the philosophical student was to see 
the philosophical falsity, and existential vacuity, of  the pursuit of  money and bodily pleasures, or the 
goods of  fame, as means to human flourishing. Instead, they were to learn to take care of  themselves, 
and pay attention first to the state of  their own psyche. As Socrates had announced in the Apology: 
I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought 
for your persons and your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest 
improvement of  the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue 
come money and every other good of  man, public as well as private.6 
iv. Unless we are awake to this ancient, existential conception of  philosophy, we cannot understand 
the literary peculiarities of  their written texts—and their systematic caution concerning writing per 
se. First, there are peculiarities of  genre: the predominance of  “Lives”, as in Diogenes Laertius’ great 
text, but also Xenephon’s Memorabilia; also dialogues, consolations, meditations, and letters. Second: 
within the ancient philosophical texts, even in their most systematic form, the Aristotelian lecture, 
contain digressions, repetitions, aporias [seeming dead-ends] which can seem to moderns unnecessary, 
lazy, or signs of  simply inferior intellectual development. In Plato’s Statesman, for instance, we are at 
one point told that the entire apparent exercise of  trying to find the statesman’s genos was “so that 
we may become better dialecticians on all possible subjects.”7 For Hadot, to read ancient philosophy 
awake to its different metaphilosophical perspective was to read each word and line 
From the perspective of  the effect it was intended to produce in the soul of  the auditor or 
reader ... for the content of  the work is partly determined by the necessity of  adapting itself  
to the addressee’s spiritual capacities ... Whether the goal was to console, to cure, or to 
exhort the audience, the point was always and above all not to communicate to them some 
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ready-made knowledge but to form them.8 
v. The classical conception of  philosophy is largely lost today, certainly within the university context. 
The larger reasons for this lie in Christianity’s emergence as a rival philosophia in the ancient sense, 
including adapting many of  the philosophical schools’ spiritual exercises. With the closure of  the schools, 
philosophy survived only as discourse (pre-eminently neo-Platonic theology then, in later medieval 
scholasticism, Aristotelian dialectics), in service to Christian theology. Following the emergence of  
the natural sciences from theological supervision in the early modern period, philosophical discourse 
was largely reshaped as a handmaiden to these sciences, or their critic. In figures like Montaigne, 
Goethe, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein—and even in the literary form of  Descartes’ Meditations and 
Kant’s assertion of  the primacy of  practical reason—the ancient conception of  philosophy as a bios 
periodically resurfaces. However, in the modern university context, “philosophy is first and foremost 
a discourse developed in the classroom, and then consigned to books. It is a text which requires 
exegesis.”9 As for its purveyors:
The philosophy professor [is] a civil servant whose job, to a large extent, is training other 
civil servants. The goal is no longer, as it was in antiquity, to train people for careers as 
human beings, but to train them for careers as clerks or professors—that is, as specialists, 
theoreticians, and retainers of  specific items of  more or less esoteric knowledge. Such 
knowledge, however, no longer involves the whole of  life, as ancient philosophy demanded.10 
ANTITHESES
The manifold virtues of  Hadot’s work are now widely acknowledged. In harmony with his critique of  purely 
academic philosophy, Hadot’s texts are a model of  classical clarity, if  not what the Stoics called aproptosia, the 
absence of  hurry in judgment. By drawing attention to philosophy as praxis, Hadot’s work shows how philosophy 
did and can still have a role in shaping the ethical lives and cultures of  ordinary men and women. The manifold 
letters which Arnold Davidson relays Hadot received from people around the world, stating how “he had 
changed their lives” is perhaps the most authentic tribute to the man and his work. From a metaphilosophical 
perspective, Hadot’s What is Ancient Philosophy? and the essays in Philosophy as a Way of  Life challenge us to each 
reflect on what drew us to pursuing philosophical discourse, and what it is that we each hope or want from 
philosophy as we perceive it. From a hermeneutic or academic perspective, finally, the conception of  ancient 
philosophy as a way of  life is overwhelmingly supported by manifold textual evidence. It allows us to reopen 
and critically analyse ancient texts on their own terms. This is not to lay down our critical guns before ancient 
authorities. It is to understand what we are critiquing, so—unlike the commentators on Aurelius who see his 
repeated, highly stylised meditations on transience, for instance, as sign of  some psychosomatic pathology—our 
criticisms do not lamentably miss the mark. 
Although his work is framed almost exclusively in the form of  the commentary, the full force of  Hadot’s work, I 
take it, is not one of  scholarly antiquarianism. It is Hadot’s attempt to reanimate for moderns the vital possibility 
of  living transformed, philosophical modes of  life. In the allegorical terms of  Goethe’s Faust Hadot admired, 
and to which we will return, the restless spirit of  the modern Faust must be wedded to Helen, representing 
ancient, contemplative beauty. To cite the dialectical conclusion to What is Ancient Philosophy?:
The reader will no doubt wish to ask if  I think the ancient concept of  philosophy might still exist today 
.... I would put the question differently: Isn’t there an urgent need to rediscover the ancient notion of  
the ‘philosopher’—that living, choosing philosopher without whom the notion of  philosophy has no 
meaning? Why not define the philosopher not as a professor or a writer who develops a philosophical 
discourse, but, in accordance with the concept which was constant in antiquity, as a person who leads 
a philosophical life?11 
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In the spirit of  ancient dialectic as Hadot describes it, then, let me now pose some critical questions to Hadot’s 
project, and recollect the deep obstacles that seem to me to stand in the way of  this reanimation of  the ancient 
model. Hadot himself  was aware of  these obstacles, as we will see, and I would argue that this awareness shapes 
his reading of  the ancients. Our closing task in the third part of  this paper will then be to evaluate the coherence 
and persuasiveness of  his responses to them.
i. Possibility: the question of  metaphysical redundancy. The ancient philosophical practices Hadot describes all 
seem to turn on what he recognises look for moderns like unmistakably “antiquated cosmological and mythical 
elements”: notably, the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian, Stoic or Epicurean, prescientific worldviews.12 This is a problem 
faced not simply by Hadot, but other attempts to somehow return to classical ethical or political paradigms: 
notably that of  the Straussian school in the United States. Hadot himself  puts things powerfully in his critique 
of  Foucault’s later idea of  an “aesthetics of  the Self ” that would allegedly take its orientation from ancient 
spiritual practices. The return to self  practised in classical philosophical askeses was a return, specifically, to the 
higher part of  one’s self  (in the Stoics the Logos), which was open to, because one small part of, “the same force 
and the same reality that is at the same time creative Nature, Norm of  conduct and Rule of  discourse.”13 The 
ancient philosophers’ ethical practices hence presupposed, or were framed, by wider metaphysical teachings 
about the nature of  reason (logos) and the cosmos. Now in Foucault, and we are wondering in Hadot also:
According to a more or less universal tendency of  modern thought, which is perhaps more instinctive 
than reflective, the idea of  ‘universal reason’ and ‘universal nature’ do not have meaning any more. 
It was therefore convenient [for Foucault] to ‘bracket’ them.14 
In short, our first question is whether Hadot too must not necessarily fall prey to the same problem he assigns 
to Foucault here, insofar as he too is not in possession of  a metaphysics consistent with the ethical practices of  
self-transformation to which he is drawn in the ancients.
ii. Desirability: the question of  other-worldliness, anaffectivity. The abiding cultural influence, and overwhelming 
successes, of  scientific naturalism, first; the particular shaping influences of  Nietzschean, psychoanalytic, and 
Hegelian thought on our philosophic culture, second; and a series of  deep intuitions concerning the inalienable 
importance of  the body, others, and the affects in living full lives, third15; can combine to make us deeply 
sceptical today of  ancient positions which seem to propose forms of  other-worldliness and what the Stoics 
termed apatheia (the absence of  feeling) as existential ideals. This in Hadot’s words is the criticism “according 
to which ancient philosophy was an escape mechanism, an act of  falling back upon oneself,”16 following the 
decline of  public rights and life in the Hellenistic period—if  not an instance of  what Nietzscheans call “life-
denial.” As Hadot observes: 
In the view of  all philosophical schools, mankind’s principal cause of  suffering, disorder and 
unconsciousness were the passions: that is, unregulated desires and exaggerated fears. People are 
prevented from truly living, it was taught, because they are dominated by the passions. Philosophy 
thus appears as a therapeutics of  the passions (in the words of  Georges Freidman: “Try to get rid of  
your passions”).17 
Let us state immediately Hadot’s two predominant forms of  response to the first charge—that concerning 
the alleged impossibility of  a modern return to classical forms of  philosophical practice, in the wake of  the 
Gallilean or Newtonian break with ancient physics. This will lead into our consideration of  how Hadot does, 
and how we might on the basis of  his work, respond to the second, normative criticisms of  possible returns to 
classical ethical praxeis. 
Firstly, Hadot repeatedly maintains that the ancient philosophical schools and bioi each responded to an 
elementary existential “experience”: as in Epicureanism, “the voice of  the flesh: not to be hungry, not to be 
thirsty, not to be cold”18; or in Stoicism, “of  the tragic situation of  human beings, who are conditioned by fate 
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.... helpless and defenceless in the face of  the accidents of  life, the setbacks of  fortune, illness, and death.”19 
The ancient spiritual exercises which seek to redress these experiences, Hadot thus claims, are “relatively 
independent” from the metaphysical systems the schools elaborated.20 These, he claims, came “after the fact 
... to describe and justify experiences whose existential density ultimately escapes all attempts at theorising and 
systematising.”21 In Aurelius, for instance, Hadot stresses a series of  fragments which reflect on what Hadot calls 
the “providence or chaotic atoms” disjunction. “If  the All is God, then all is well”, Marcus for instance says in 
the Meditations.22 But even if  the world is not providentially ordered as Stoic dogmata believe, Aurelius insists 
that “it would [still] be possible for there to be order in you, and for disorder to reign over the All.”23 In such 
an instance, indeed, you might “consider yourself  fortunate if, in the midst of  such a whirlwind, you possess a 
guiding intelligence within yourself.”24 
There is at least a tension between this position, and Hadot’s recognition for instance that the practice of  
contemplative physics in the ancient schools was recommended as a spiritual askesis, and which sees him calling 
Foucault’s later works to account, as we said.25 A second response to the problem I believe is more potentially far-
reaching. Hadot long resisted drawing the evident parallels between ancient philosophical practice and Eastern 
soteriological religion or practices, keeping his philologist’s caution concerning cross-cultural misunderstanding. 
However, further exposure to academic literature on the subject convinced Hadot “that there really are troubling 
analogies between the philosophical attitudes and those of  the Orient.”26 This remark points towards a deeper 
set of  claims at stake in Hadot’s work, very often concealed beneath the guise of  the commentator, and his own 
reticence to say which particular school of  philosophy, if  any, he advocates or practices. For instance, Hadot 
claims that the Epicurean and Stoic attitudes to existence:
Correspond to two opposite but inseparable poles of  our inner life: the demands of  our moral 
conscience, and the flourishing of  our joy in existing ... tension and relaxation, duty and serenity, 
moral conscience and the joy of  existence.27 
This means: these philosophical attitudes, far from aleatory choices, on simple par with forms of  supernaturalist 
faith, have deep-set roots in our common or natural human condition. On exactly the classical model, they 
represent invariant possibilities across times and cultures, which ought to be subject to kinds of  demonstration 
and living exemplification which will be persuasive, if  not compelling, outside of  their own contingent context of  
genesis. And this is also what Hadot says, closing his programmatic essay “Spiritual Exercises”:
Vauvenargues says: “A truly new and original book would be one which made people love old truths.” 
It is my hope that I have been “truly new and original” in this sense, since my goal has been to 
make people love a few old truths. Old truths: ... there are some truths whose meaning will never be 
exhausted by the generations of  man. It is not that they are difficult: on the contrary, they even appear 
to be banal ... Each generation must take up, from scratch, the task of  learning to read and to re-read 
these “old truths.”28 
It is this possible response, which can also speak to our anxieties concerning the seeming apatheiai of  the ancient 
philosophers, that I wish to take up in the closing section.
SYNTHESIS: ON AFFECT IN HADOT’S THOUGHT
The charge of  anaffectivity, if  not a “Platonistic” hatred of  this life in classical thought, is animated by passages 
like Phaedo 97c, in which the condemned Socrates tells his companions that philosophy is a practice of  dying to 
the distractions posed by the body’s needs. It cannot be sustained if  it is to imply that the classical philosophers 
were not concerned to theorise the body, its passions or pathoi, and our lived relations with others. Instead, 
precisely as the source of  troubling upheavals of  thought, the affects attract a diverse set of  discourses in ancient 
philosophy. In this discourse, the continuing modern disputes between Jamesian-style physicalist accounts and 
cognitive, propositional-, or belief-centred accounts is significantly anticipated. 29 The affects are first of  all the 
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subject matter that the spiritual exercises—for instance, exercises for managing grief  or anger—are aimed at. 
(This in fact is what animates Hadot’s choice of  the signifier “spiritual”, as against “rational” or “cognitive”30). 
As Hadot comments in an interview: 
What’s interesting about the idea of  a spiritual exercise is precisely that it is not a matter of  purely 
rational consideration, but the putting in action of  all kinds of  means, intended to act upon oneself. 
Imagination and affectivity play a capital role here: we must represent to ourselves in vivid colours the dangers 
of  such-and-such a passion, and use striking formulations of  ideas in order to exhort ourselves. We 
must create habits and fortify ourselves by preparing against hardships in advance.31 
Albert Camus, in his essay “Helen’s Exile” had commented that ancient philosophy contains everything: 
“reason, nonsense, and myths”, whereas modern philosophy keeps itself  to reason or nonsense.32 So too, Hadot 
repeatedly emphasises the importance of  the imaginative rhetorical devices—like counter-factuals, imagined 
characters and dialogues, or the “view from above”—deployed by the ancient philosophers, in their attempts 
to shake their addressees out of  habitual pre-philosophic ways of  interpreting and experiencing. One of  the 
reasons Hadot so admires Marcus Aurelius is that the author, trained in rhetoric, was a marvellous stylist. The 
emperor-philosopher both drew upon a set of  standard Stoic imaginative figures, and developed several of  his 
own, as means to find the most “striking, effective formula” to reactivate Stoic principles in his own mind.33 
In the Veil of  Isis, we can be surprised to find Hadot arguing that the apparently distinctly modern privileging 
of  aesthetic perception in romantic and vitalist reactions against mechanistic science and capitalist reification 
reactivates the imaginative exercises of  what Hadot elsewhere calls practical physics:
Since antiquity, people had been aware of  the degradation of  perception brought about by habit and 
interest. In order to rediscover pure perception ... we must, says Lucretius ... “First of  all, contemplate 
the clear, pure colour of  the sky and all it contains within it: the stars wandering everywhere, the 
moon, the sun and its light with its incomparable brilliance: [as] if  all these objects appeared to 
mortals today for the first time, if  they appeared before the eyes suddenly and unexpectedly.”34 
However, the critical charge concerning the anaffectivity and other-worldiness of  classical philosophy is 
primarily an evaluative one, rather than a false claim that classical philosophy had little to say on the affects and 
imagination. A rich affective life, we tend to hold, is a necessary part of  psychological flourishing. Moreover, 
affects like love are the portals to the highest and most enduring pleasures, and the most meaningful connections 
with other human beings. Some negative or discomfiting affects, like guilt and shame, are surely amongst the 
greatest motivators to future goods. To strive for anything like Stoic apatheia seems as fundamentally inhumane 
and ethically wrong-headed to us, as it already did to Augustine, or differently Friedrich Nietzsche.
Let us then consider the Stoic account of  affect one contemporary version of  which has recently been defended 
very seriously by Martha Nussbaum, amongst others. The Stoics were psychological monists. While they did 
not deny affects involve physical transformations, they held that affects necessarily involved propositional beliefs 
about the world. More than this—at least after Chrysippus—the Stoics maintained that affects were sufficiently 
identifiable (i.e. their differentiating kind was given) as particular species of  judgment. Each affective judgment, 
to specify, involved two propositional components: first, a subjective evaluation of  some event or state of  affairs, 
as good or bad; and second, what we would call a reflexive component, in which a certain response by the 
subject is adjudged appropriate, justified, or in order (kathekon). Desire for instance involves holding some future 
state of  affairs (for instance, sexual intercourse) as a good, an evaluation which rationally justifies the individual 
pursuing that object. Fear, like desire, concerns some future state of  affairs: but this time this state of  affairs 
is deemed in some way bad; an evaluation which justifies fight, fright, or flight. Pleasure and pain by contrast 
involve things presently occurring; the first, perceived good experiences or states of  affairs justifying elation, 
the second, as in mourning, jealousy, and regret, involving perceived ills which justify one’s being upset. Seneca 
later added a third component to the Stoic account of  affect: one in which the ruling faculty (what the Greek 
Stoics called the hegemonikon) is “carried away” (the Latin efferantur), and one forms the additional belief  that 
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doing anything it takes, “come what may” (utique/ek pantos ge tropou), to attain or avoid the object in question—as 
in blinding rage, also-known-as the propositional attitude “I’ll kill him, come what may!”35
As Brad Inwood stresses, the Stoic identification of  affects with judgments—already ridiculed as unduly 
cognitive in the ancient world by the Platonist Galen, and Posidonius within their own school—unquestionably 
responds to the therapeutic origin and aim of  the philosophy, stressed also by Hadot.36 As in psychoanalytic and 
cognitive behavioural therapies today, if  affects not only involve, but saliently are, judgments, this means they 
are amenable to discursive, philosophical therapy. In Stoic thought, while we cannot control the impressions, 
and even the involuntary “first movements” external events might provoke (including physiological reactions 
like erections), it remains in our power to give or withhold assent to the impulses our experience provokes. 
Philosophical exercises—what Hadot describes in terms of  “intense meditation on fundamental dogmas, the 
ever-renewed awareness of  the finitude of  life, the examination of  one’s conscience”37—aim to correct both 
the evaluative component involved in our affective response to things, and accordingly our assessment of  which 
actions are appropriate for us to undertake (ta kathekonta). For the Stoics, that is—and Hadot claims this applies 
also to Epicureanism in the distinction between unnecessary and necessary desires—the passions involve false 
evaluative attitudes. This falsity is why they invariably engender unhappiness. They falsely represent things—
pre-eminently money and bodily pleasures, and fame and social status—which are beyond our control, transient, 
indifferently distributed by nature to both good people and bad, and which are not sufficient for our attaining 
happiness, as if they were essential to our flourishing. To assent to the affects is then to assent to make one’s 
happiness a hostage to fortune, and guarantee one’s future rendezvous with forms of  fear and pain. Stoicism 
does not advocate that the would-be sage wholly withdraws interest from all worldly goods and relations. Hadot 
cites Epictetus enjoining us to “eat like a man, drink like a man .... get married, have children, take part in civic 
life, learn how to put up with insults and tolerate other people.”38 It does however prescribe hypoexairesis, an 
attitude of  reserve, as we pursue these things: a reserve corresponding to an enlightened sense that they cannot 
deliver the eudaimonia we each aim for in pursuing them.
So, the critics’ question recurs: do not the ancients sanctify a form of  philosophic life-denial or other-worldliness, 
and to the extent Hadot advocates a return to their modes of  living, is he not complicit in this undesirable 
pursuit? 
Hadot’s response to this question, as in fact Foucault’s came to be, is a many-sided: no. Ancient philosophy 
involves for him not a devaluation of  this life, so much as what Nietzsche termed a revaluation of  values. The 
withdrawal of  our eudemonic attachments to money, status, and physical pleasures is answered by a refocused 
attachment to the circle of  things we can each control: pre-eminently the assents and impulses of  our own 
psyche, but also the manner in which we perform the actions we are at any given moment undertaking. The end 
of  these philosophies, which are after all each eudemonic in orientation, is only apatheia in the sense that pathos 
here implies passivity or dependence, and hence spiritual heterarchy. For Epicurus, the highest end of  philosophy 
is a now-philosophically-reformed species of  pleasure, untroubled by fear over death (which is nothing to us), 
the uncertainty of  the future, and regrets concerning the past (both of  which lie beyond our present control). 
The Stoic sage attains to eupatheia, which involves a fitting joy (chara) in the awareness of  one’s ethical progress, 
gladness (euphrosune) at the deeds and good fortune of  the temperate, and a cheerfulness (euthymia) in accepting 
the order of  the world, in which Nature has given us each, in our psyches, the means to attain happiness.39 
This is why, in an essay which takes its title from Goethe, Hadot beautifully analyses the allegorical encounter 
between Faust and Helen in The Second Faust as emblematic of  the species of  experience he takes it that 
philosophy as a way of  life is there to provoke. In this encounter, at the height of  his overflowing love for 
Helen, representative of  ancient beauty, Faust declares: “now the spirit looks not forward, nor behind. Only 
the present—” , and Helen completes the couplet for him “—is our happiness.”40 The philosophical content of  
the thought here follows only from the fundamental Stoic kephalaion (leading principle) that it is not rational to 
worry about what we cannot alter—since it is, ex hypothesi, beyond our control. Its result is a teaching concerning 
the peculiar temporality of  happiness: “a radical transformation, which must be active at each instant of  life, 
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of  mankind’s attitude towards time.”41 “Two things must be cut short”, Hadot quotes Seneca, “the fear of  the 
future and the memory of  past discomfort: the one does not concern me anymore, and the other does not 
concern me yet.”42 It also in this way corresponds to a very simple ontological truth: that the present is the only 
reality at any given time that is available to us, and in which we can think or act.43 To focus only on transforming 
that small part of  reality presently given to us is hence expressive of  a fundamental assent to or affirmation of  
the world as we find it: this is the famous Stoic amor fati later reactivated by Nietzsche.44 “And don’t believe that 
[the sage] is content with not very much,” Seneca cautions us, “for what he has is everything.”45 Hadot rejoins:
One could speak here of  a mystical dimension to Stoicism. At each moment, and every instant, 
we must say “yes” to the universe, that is, to the will of  universal reason. We must want what [this] 
universal reason wants: that is, the present instant, exactly as it is ..... Marcus, for his part, cries out: 
“I say to the universe: ‘I love along with you.’”46 
And we can see here how this askesis then is in fact intended to be profoundly liberating or life-affirming. As 
Marcus explains:
If  you work at that which is before you, following right reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without 
allowing anything else to distract you, but keeping the divine part pure as if  you should be bound to 
give it back immediately; if  you hold to this, expecting nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with the 
present activity according to nature, and with truth in every word and sound which you utter, you will 
live happy. And there is no man who is able to prevent this.47 
Characteristically, Hadot finds this same spiritual attitude, in nearly identical terms, at the heart of  Goethe’s 
poetry, and his intellectual sensibility:
Would you model for yourself  a pleasant life?
Worry not about the past 
Let not anger get the upper hand
Rejoice in the present without ceasing
Hate no man
And the future? Abandon it to god.48 
Far from a longing for another world or life, indeed, Hadot stresses that it is more true to say that what is in 
play here is a focusing and intensifying of  present experience, which the Stoics call prosoche (roughly, attention). 
If  both Epicureanism and Stoicism hence encourage meditation on death, this is not out of  any morbidity: 
and here Hadot chastens Spinoza, who otherwise owes so much to the Stoics. To constantly meditate upon 
the present possibility and eventual certainty one’s death, and on the transience of  world affairs, is rather to 
heighten our sense of  the singular, irreplaceable uniqueness of  each moment:
We not only can but we must be happy right now. The matter is urgent, for the future is uncertain, 
and death is a constant threat “while we’re waiting to live, life passes by.”49 
Or, as Hadot cites Epicurus in the essay on “Spiritual Exercises”:
We are born once, and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not 
master of  tomorrow, postpone your happiness; life is wasted in procrastination and each one of  us 
dies overwhelmed with cares.50 
Concerning others, and the anxiety that to pursue a philosophical way of  life is to close ourselves off  from 
genuine experiences of  intersubjectivity, or accustom us to passively accept the injustices of  the world, Hadot 
again urges us to contest this image. Unburdened by worries about past and future, unconditional commitments 
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to alienable, perishable goods, or the sense that others could fundamentally harm us, the individual who has 
attained to a philosophical existence on this Hadotian model is, by his reckoning, going to become much more, 
not less available and open, to treat others in a just or benevolent manner. Focussed on the present, they will 
be more reasonably able to appraise what is politically possible, and to seize with presence of  mind what the 
Stoics called the kairos or decisive moment for a particular action.51 As Hadot details in What is Ancient Philosophy?, 
central to each of  the ancient philosophic schools are models of  pedagogic practice and philia, not to mention 
competing understandings of  the philosopher’s civic role—from the Platonic ambition to educate political 
leaders, to forms of  political withdrawal (do no harm) characteristic of  the Epicureans and the Cynics. The 
ancient schools each, certainly, opposed pitying the suffering of  non-philosophers. But this was not out of  an 
absence of  fellow feeling, nor does it commit them to accepting injustice without protest. Rather, it was out of  
a philosophical awareness of  people’s common, innate rational capacities, and with it their active capacity to 
see and pursue what is truly conducive to happiness which they, again like Nietzsche, saw compromised by the 
tendency to pityingly objectify the other as wholly a victim. What will be required in different cases, depending 
on the context and audience, are the different species of  speech act which the different ancient texts in fact 
practice: “exhortation, reprimands, consolation, instruction.”52 Hadot closes What is Ancient Philosophy? with the 
repeated emphasis: 
We must never forget that ancient philosophical life was always intimately linked to the care of  others, 
and that this demand is inherent in the philosophical life ... The philosopher is cruelly aware of  his 
solitude and impotence in a world torn between two states of  unconsciousness: the idolatry of  money 
and the suffering of  billions of  human beings. In such conditions, the philosopher will surely never be 
able to attain the absolute serenity of  the sage ... But ancient philosophy also teaches us not to resign 
ourselves, but to continue to act reasonably and try to live according to the norm constituted by the 
Idea of  wisdom, whatever happens, and even if  our actions seem very limited to us. In the words of  
Marcus Aurelius: “Do not wait for Plato’s Republic, but be happy if  one little thing leads to progress 
and reflect on the fact that what results from such a little thing is not, in fact, so very little.”53 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Pierre Hadot was by all accounts that, very rare, combination his thought concerning the nature of  ancient 
philosophy prescribes: a man of  great learning who was yet “discrete, almost self-effacing.”54 In this piece, we 
have wanted to offer a small, discursive or critical tribute to his work and legacy. We have now raised the two 
greatest hesitations that it seem to us oppose Hadot’s project of  reanimating the ancient philosophic ideals. 
In addressing the anxiety that ancient philosophy is anaffective and life-denying, we have also aimed to bring 
out what seems to us the most provocative of  Hadot’s claims: that the ancient philosophical comportments 
represent fundamental, eudemonistic possibilities for human beings, across culture and time. The fundamental 
attitude of  Hadot’s ancient philosopher, we have seen, is not one of  self-denial, or the wish to escape from 
this life, in all its misery and its splendour. It is a revaluation of  one’s way of  being in and seeing the world, 
premised on a very small number of  orienting rational principles: notably the Stoic distinctions between what 
does or does not depend on us, or the Epicurean distinctions between natural, necessary and unnecessary 
desires. It is this provocative set of  claims that underlie Hadot’s claim for the relative independence of  ancient 
philosophic asksesis from the metaphysics which served in the old schools to frame them—and so for their 
potential availability as existential options for modern men and women. 
This paper does not pretend to have raised or addressed all of  the potential issues that arise, concerning either 
the exegetical accuracy of  Hadot’s reconstruction of  the ancients, his (arguably problematic) commitment to 
a syncretic single notion of  one “ancient philosophy”, or the wider, contemporary significance of  his ethical 
thought. In a period when the revealed religions are claiming a monopoly on substantive axiological discourse, 
and the pressing need to re-evaluate the modern Western attitude towards nature is becoming more evident 
every day, the ancient naturalistic ethical perspectives Hadot’s work allows us so clearly to see seem extremely 
timely. Great now is the need, not by giving up, but by reshaping reason, to recapture that “profound feeling of  
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participation in and identification with a reality which transcends the limits of  the individual.”55 which Pierre 
Hadot positions at the heart of  ancient Western philosophy. For, in the words of  the modern author, Goethe, 
whom Hadot most often cited as, like himself  “half  Stoic and half  Epicurean”56: “Great is the joy of  existence, 
and greater yet we feel in the presence of  the world.”57 
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